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PROPENSITY TO JUST MEET OR BEAT QUARTERLY EARNINGS FORECASTS: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF SOX SECTIONS 302 AND 906
Stacy Ann Mastrolia, Bucknell University
This paper examines whether the provisions of SOX Sections 302 and 906 are associated with improved quarterly
financial reporting quality. SOX 302 and 906 require that senior managers certify the accuracy of their quarterly
financial statements, and false certification now carries criminal penalties. Specifically, this paper examines whether
companies are more or less likely to just meet or beat their quarterly earnings forecasts following the implementation of
SOX 302 and 906. My results indicate that following Sox 302 and 906, companies are less likely to just meet or beat their
quarterly earnings forecasts for quarters 2, 3, and 4, suggesting that SOX 302 and 906 are associated with improved
financial reporting quality.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines whether companies are more or
less likely to just meet or beat their quarterly earnings
forecasts, a proxy for quarterly financial reporting quality,
post-SOX 302 and 906. My results indicate that following
SOX 302 and 906, companies are less likely to just meet or
beat their quarterly earnings forecasts for quarters 2, 3, and
4, suggesting that SOX 302 and 906 are associated with
improved financial reporting quality.
Following disclosure of some of the most shocking
corporate frauds in history1, Congress passed the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX). One of the primary goals of SOX
is to improve financial reporting quality for public
companies. The provisions of Section 302 require that the
CEO and CFO of a public company personally certify the
accuracy and completeness of the company’s financial
statements, including the effectiveness of internal control
over financial reporting and any material changes in internal
control ("Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002").2 Section 906
imposes severe criminal penalties for false management
certifications made knowingly or willfully; these penalties
far surpass the previous penalties for lying to the auditors.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) clearly
intends that managements’ increased ownership of and
liability for the accuracy of the financial statements, created
by Sections 302 and 906, would improve quarterly (and
annual) financial reporting quality.
However, it may be true that the personal certification
requirement is no more than symbolic; even before SOX,
antifraud law and the rules governing the disclosure of
documents to the SEC placed responsibility on corporate
managers and directors for both the accuracy and the
completeness of financial statement disclosure, and stated
the penalty for the failure to disclose (Alverson, 2005;
Cunningham, 2002; Fairfax, 2002). Therefore, whether
SOX Sections 302 and 906 actually affect a company’s
1
Adelphia, Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, Waste Management, WorldCom,
and others.
2
The scope of this certification surpasses the assertions previously made in
the management letter provided to the auditor.

quarterly financial reporting quality is an empirical question,
which I investigate in this paper.
In addition to determining quarterly financial reporting
quality following the implementation of SOX Sections 302
and 906, I propose that, because these sections directly affect
primarily the cost-benefit function of management (not the
auditors), these provisions offer researchers a unique
environment to try to disentangle the “joint measure of
financial reporting quality” that is a limitation in so much of
the literature. In most research designs it is not possible to
disentangle the separate effects of management and auditors
on reporting quality and, as a result, most studies can only
evaluate financial reporting quality as a joint measure of the
quality of management reporting and the quality of the
auditor. Because SOX 302 and 906 in the quarterly
environment directly change primarily the consequences
(liabilities) to managers, these provisions, in the quarterly
reporting environment, should allow us to try to separate
these effects. These provisions do not directly change the
auditor’s role in the quarterly financial reporting process;
both before and after the implementation of these provisions,
auditors are responsible for reviewing (not auditing) the
quarterly financial statements on a contemporaneous basis.
Existing literature indicates that a company’s ability to
just meet or beat their earnings estimates is a sign of
earnings management (or expectations management) and is,
therefore, a sign of lower financial reporting quality (Cotter,
Tuna, Wysocki, & Callen, 2006; Matsumoto, 2002;
Richardson, Teoh, & Wysocki, 2004). This paper adds to
that literature by providing evidence of the effect of SOX
Sections 302 and 906 on a company’s propensity to just
meet or beat their quarterly earnings forecasts, and,
therefore, on quarterly financial reporting quality.
The quarterly reporting environment is an ideal setting
to look at managements’ actions for two primary reasons.
First, previous research indicates that quarterly financial
statements are subject to more management judgment than
are annual financial statements because Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) allow some discretion in the

107
Published by FHSU Scholars Repository, 2010

1

Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching (2005-2012), Vol. 6 [2010], No. 1, Art. 12
Mastrolia

quarterly timing of recording certain adjustments.3 Second,
quarterly financial statements are reviewed but not audited
by the external auditor, potentially allowing more
management discretion (Mendenhall & Nichols, 1988). I
anticipate that Sections 302 and 906 will increase the quality
of reported quarterly earnings both by providing an incentive
to managers to improve their estimation process and by
curbing deliberate earnings management.
The results of my tests indicate that quarterly financial
reporting quality improves in the post-SOX period for
quarters 2, 3, and 4. This study makes several contributions
to the literature. First, the goal of SOX is to improve
financial reporting quality and this study provides evidence
that quarterly financial reporting quality improves following
the implementation of these provisions. Second, because
SOX 302 and 906 primarily affect managements’ incentives
to improve quarterly financial reporting quality, and
financial reporting quality improves in interim quarters as
well as the fourth quarter, this study provides some evidence
that management has improved financial reporting quality
separate from the effect of the auditor on the financial
statements. Third, because my results indicate improved
financial reporting quality, this study provides some
indication of an association between increased individual
criminal liability and changes in managers’ behaviors when
faced with relatively higher potential personal cost versus
relatively lower potential personal cost while holding the
gain function essentially constant. The results of this study
should be interesting to policy setters and regulators (SEC
and PCAOB), auditors, investors, academic researchers, and
managers.
BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND
HYPOTHESIS
Selected Sarbanes-Oxley Act Provisions
SOX instituted many corporate reporting, corporate
governance and auditor-related changes including those
detailed in Sections 302, 906 and 404. Section 302 of SOX
became effective for all SEC registrants for fiscal years
ending after August 29, 2002. Section 302 requires the CEO
and CFO of a public company to personally certify the
accuracy and completeness of the company’s financial
statements filed with the SEC,4 including the effectiveness
of internal control over financial reporting and any material
changes in internal control.
3

While quarterly revenues are recognized on the same basis as annual fiscal
periods, APB 28 allows certain costs, that must be expensed during the
year, to be deferred or accrued at the end of an interim quarter based on
managements’ expectations about the results for the entire fiscal year. For
example, certain expenses (management bonuses, warranty costs,
advertising costs) may be recorded to expense in interim quarters based on
forecasted annual sales and adjusted to actual sales at year end (Mendenhall
& Nichols, 1988).
4
The public filings and Section 302 certifications for all public companies
are available at www.sec.gov.
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Some legal professionals have stated that the provisions
of SOX have altered significantly the prosecutorial
landscape on which the Justice Department and agency
investigations will play out (Clayton & Mackintosh, 2002).
Specifically, Section 302 targets the preferred defense of
“who me?” offered by individual senior managers during a
corporate fraud investigation. Using this defense, the senior
manager usually demonstrated that he had no knowledge of
the problem and would have remedied the problem if he had
known and, the defense went, because the problem was a
corporate issue not an individual issue, the senior manager
should not be charged. Section 302 now requires by law that
senior managers maintain a system of internal controls
designed to ensure that material information concerning
corporate activities are made known to them. Additionally,
the senior management of a company is responsible for
validating that the system of internal controls is functional.
Fairfax (2002) states that the 302 certification requirement is
not nominal, but rather subjects a senior manager, who signs
the certification knowing that it contains material
inaccuracies, to both civil and criminal liability.
Recently two accounting studies have examined the
relation between SOX Section 302 and financial reporting
quality (Bédard, 2006; Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Doyle, Ge,
& McVay, 2007; Ge & McVay, 2005; Lobo & Zhou, 2006;
McEnroe, 2007). The results of these studies indicate that
annual financial reporting quality improved following SOX.
However, there are two significant differences between these
studies and my study. First, I examine quarterly, not annual,
financial reporting quality and, as I explain in this article,
there are critical differences between quarterly reported
earnings and annual reported earnings. For that reason, I
believe it is important to examine the relation between
Section 302 and quarterly financial reporting quality, in
addition to the existing studies on annual financial reporting
quality. Second, by using the quarterly reporting
environment following the implementation of Sections 302
and 906, this study offers some opportunity to disentangle
managements’ effect on quarterly financial reporting quality
from the auditor’s effect; it is impossible to disentangle the
separate effects of managers and auditors on financial
reporting quality when examining annual financial reports.
There is one current working paper I am aware of that
examines quarterly financial reporting quality following
SOX; the results in Mastrolia (2010) indicate that companies
exhibiting aggressive quarterly earnings management preSOX are associated with improved quarterly financial
reporting quality post-SOX.
Section 906 requires that each periodic financial report
containing financial statements filed with the SEC include a
written statement by the CEO and CFO certifying that the
report fully complies with the regulations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information in the report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
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condition and results of operations of the filer.5,6 Section
906 also imposes severe criminal penalties for CEOs and
CFOs who knowingly or willfully provide false
certifications of periodic financial reports. Executives, who
knowingly certify a filing that does not meet all of the
requirements of this section, can be fined not more than
$1,000,000, or be imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both. Additionally, anyone who willfully certifies a
statement as noted above, knowing that the filing does not
meet all of the requirements of this section, can be fined not
more than $5,000,000, or be imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both.
To date, Section 906 has not been the subject of much
accounting research. Levinsohn (2003) cites a June 2003
survey by the Association for Financial Professionals7
regarding the prevalence of a “subcertification” affidavit
among corporate managers.8 According to Levinsohn, the
frequency and scope of “subcertifications” would seem to
indicate that CEOs and CFOs considered the penalties
identified in Section 906 to be concerning.
Section 404 of SOX became effective for accelerated
filers for fiscal years ending after November 15, 2004.9
Section 404 requires that each annual report (1) contain an
internal control report which states the responsibility of
management for establishing and maintaining an adequate
internal control system and related procedures for financial
reporting; (2) contain an assessment by management of the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures
at the end of the most recent fiscal year; and (3) contain a
statement that the audit firm issuing the audit report attests
to, and reports on, the assessment of internal controls made
by management.
This study attempts to isolate the effect of Section 302
certifications and the Section 906 penalties on quarterly
financial reporting quality, in part because it is within this
environment that this study can offer some contribution
regarding the actions and motivations of management
separate from the actions and motivations of the auditor.
The Section 404 certifications require both managements’
certification and an auditor’s opinion resulting in financial
statements that provide a joint measure of financial reporting
quality. In an attempt to separate the effects of Sections 302

5
This sounds similar to the provisions of Section 302, however Section 906
additionally requires CEOs and CFOs to certify that the report “fully
complies” with the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act.
6
The public filings and Section 906 certifications for all public companies
are available at www.sec.gov.
7
http://www.afponline.org
8
Levinsohn suggests that CEOs and CFOs require “subcertification”
because they typically do not personally prepare the financial information
included in the 10-Ks and 10-Qs.
9
Accelerated filers are defined by SEC rule 13b-2 and generally refer to
public companies with market capitalization of at least $75 million.
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and 906 from those of Section 404, I compare the quarterly
financial reporting quality for 2001 and 2003.10
Importance of Quarterly Reporting
Existing literature indicates that reported quarterly
earnings are valuable to investors. Beaver (1998) developed
three theoretical links between earnings and share prices:
current earnings provide information to predict future
earnings, future earnings provide information about future
dividends, and future dividends provide information to
determine share value. Extensive literature has shown that
negative earnings surprises often have severe adverse
valuation consequences (Brown & Caylor, 2005; Dechow,
Richardson, & Tuna, 2003; Skinner & Sloan, 2002) and that
executives appear to use earnings management techniques in
order to avoid negative earnings surprises (Barton & Simko,
2002; Bartov, Givoly, & Hayn, 2002; Burgstahler & Eames,
2006; Matsumoto, 2002).
Management can influence interim quarter reported
earnings for two primary reasons: first the accounting rules
allow for more management judgment when reporting
earnings for interim quarters and second, auditors review,
but do not audit, interim period results. The Accounting
Principles Board Opinion No. 28 - Interim Financial
Reporting (APB 28) contains GAAP for interim financial
statements (Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 28:
Interim Financial Reporting, 1973). As an example, APB 28
requires that interim financial reports contain reasonable
estimates of costs or expenses based on all available
information applied consistently across periods. However,
period costs that benefit more than one interim period may
be expensed as incurred or allocated between interim periods
based on several methods.11 Because managers use their
expectations to form cost estimates in interim periods, they
have greater influence over interim quarterly earnings than
over fourth quarter earnings.
Also, because interim quarter reported earnings are
reviewed but not audited, managers have more discretion
over interim quarter reported results than over annual results.
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 100: Interim Financial
Information (SAS 100) states that a review of interim
financial information is significantly different from an audit
of financial information because a review consists primarily
of inquiry and analytical procedures while an audit includes
substantive audit tests and the collection of corroborative
evidence (Statement on Auditing Standards No. 100: Interim
Financial Information, 2002). The limited scope of the
auditor’s involvement in the quarterly financial reporting
process potentially allows management more discretion and,
thereby, provides a unique environment for this research
10

Section 302 and 906 became effective in 2002 and Section 404 became
effective in late 2004, so this research design offers an opportunity to isolate
the effects of Sections 302 and 906 from the effects of Section 404.
11
For example: estimate of time period expired, benefit received, expected
sales, expected volumes, etc.
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project to try to separate the joint measure of financial
reporting quality.
Measuring Quarterly Financial Reporting Quality
This study investigates whether Sections 302 and 906
affect managers’ behaviors, resulting in improved quarterly
financial reporting quality as proxied by a company’s
likelihood to just meet or beat their quarterly earnings
forecasts. Previous literature indicates that the ability of a
company to just meet or beat by just $0.01 their earnings
estimate is a sign of earnings management (or expectations
management) and is therefore indicative of lower financial
reporting quality (Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, & McInnis,
2009; Cotter, et al., 2006; Matsumoto, 2002; Richardson, et
al., 2004). Specifically, Graham et al. (Graham, Harvey, &
Rajgopal, 2005) surveyed 400 financial executives who
admitted to a range of activities they would undertake in
order to meet or just beat an earnings forecast, including
decreasing discretionary spending, drawing down existing
reserves, recording revenues in the current quarter rather
than the following quarter, and postponing an accounting
charge. These authors find that 78% of the surveyed
executives are willing to give up economic value to meet the
earnings expectations of analysts and investors. Graham et
al. also provide an extensive discussion and survey results
on why executives are driven to just meet or beat by just
$0.01 earnings benchmarks. A large body of empirical
literature also provides evidence that companies have capital
market incentives to achieve earnings forecasts (Bartov, et
al., 2002; Brown & Pinello, 2008; Skinner & Sloan, 2002).
Based on this existing literature, I would expect that if
Sections 302 and 906 are effective in modifying corporate
managers’ earnings management behavior, companies would
be less likely to just meet or beat by just $0.01 their
quarterly earnings forecasts post-SOX Sections 302 and 906
(2003) than pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2001). This
leads to my hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Companies will be less likely to just
meet or beat by just $0.01 their quarterly earnings
forecasts for each of the four quarters post-SOX
Sections 302 and 906 (2003) as compared to the
respective same-quarter pre-SOX Sections 302 and
906 (2001).
I test the relation between Sections 302 and 906 and
quarterly financial reporting quality by comparing the
“same-quarter” periods before and after the implementation
of these Sections. I limit my study to companies with
December 31st year-ends in order to eliminate the
confounding effects of different year-end dates and different
seasonality effects.12 The four calendar quarters of 2001 are
12

For example Q2 may not be comparable between a retailer with a
December 31st year end and a retailer with a June 30th year end.

defined as the pre-SOX period and the four calendar quarters
of 2003 as the post-SOX period. For example, this study
will compare management’s propensity to just meet or beat
earnings forecasts for Q1 (Q2, Q3, Q4) of 2001 with Q1
(Q2, Q3, Q4) of 2003.
I expect the interim quarter results (Q1, Q2 and Q3) to
indicate the change in reporting quality due primarily to the
managers’ effect on financial reporting quality because, as
stated previously, the auditor’s role in quarterly financial
reporting did not directly change during the test period.
However, I expect the Q4 results to indicate the change in
reporting quality due to both the managers’ effect and the
auditor’s effect on financial reporting quality as both parties
play a significant role in the reporting quality for the fourth
quarter results. An evaluation of the interim quarter results
and the fourth quarter results should provide information
about the relative change in reporting quality attributable to
both managers and auditors in the time period surrounding
the implementation of SOX.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Data
The provisions of SOX that I am interested in testing
apply to all U.S. publicly traded companies with December
31st year ends and available data on IBES and Compustat
quarterly industrial files in order to calculate the model for
the four quarters of 2001 and the four quarters of 2003.13 ,14
All forecast data are the consensus forecasts from IBES. All
accounting data are retrieved from the Compustat quarterly
industrial files.
Empirical Model
I use a logistic regression model to evaluate the
likelihood that a company would just meet or beat by just
$0.01 their quarterly earnings forecast before and after SOX
302 and 906.15 The dependent variable is the likelihood of a
company to just meet or beat their quarterly earnings
forecast amounts. The test variable is the pre-SOX versus
post-SOX periods. The model includes control variables for
factors prior research shows are significant in predicting a
company’s likelihood of meeting analysts’ forecasts:
whether a company reports a loss in the period, company
size and company growth (Brown, 2001; Matsumoto, 2002;
Richardson, et al., 2004; Skinner & Sloan, 2002). My test
model is as follows:

13

I will exclude ADRs from this analysis to focus on U.S. companies.
This restriction likely introduces survivorship bias into the sample
resulting in the inclusion of a higher number of larger and more stable
companies. I expect that this bias would cause me to be less likely to find
results, thereby creating a more conservative test of my research question.
15
As noted above, the pre-SOX period is 2001 and the post-SOX period is
2003.
14
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Table 2 reports the correlation matrix. No correlation
coefficient exceeds 0.32, indicating that multicollinearity is
not a factor in the results.
Where:
Table 3 displays the multiple regression results in the
MBEit
= is a binary variable that equals 1 if the company
either exactly meets or just beats (by $0.01) their odds ratio format. These results indicate that companies are
less likely, post-SOX, to just meet or beat their quarterly
quarterly earnings forecast for company i in
earnings forecasts in quarters 2, 3 and 4, compared to the
quarter t, 0 otherwise;
SOXit
= is a binary variable that equals 1 if the quarterly pre-SOX period. There is no difference in the likelihood to
just meet or beat their quarterly earnings forecasts in quarter
financial statement is for a quarter in 2003, 0
1. Specifically, the odds ratio of a company either meeting
otherwise;
Lossit
= is a binary variable that equals 1 if the company or just beating the earnings forecast post-SOX is .70 to 1 in
quarter 2. Said differently, the chances of a company either
reports a loss for company i in quarter t, 0
meeting or just beating the earnings forecast post-SOX is
otherwise;
only about 70% of the odds of a firm meeting or just beating
Sizeit
= natural log of the market value of equity for
the forecast in the pre-Sox regime; the odds are lower in the
company i at the end of the quarter (t-1);
post-SOX regime. Overall, these results support my
Growthit = natural log of the market to book ratio for
hypothesis and provide some indication that companies have
company i at the end of the quarter (t-1).
improved quarterly financial reporting quality following the
implementation of SOX 302 and 906. The likelihood ratio
My model includes two observations for each company:
chi-square values of 27.11 to 72.02 with p-values of less
the pre-SOX 302 and 906 period and the post-SOX 302 and
than 0.0001 tells us that my test model as a whole fits
906 period. Because having multiple observations from one
significantly better than a model with no predictors.
company can result in serial correlation of the error terms, I
use robust standard errors in my main analysis and perform a Additionally I ran both Pearson and Hosmer-Lemeshow
goodness of fit tests the results of which suggest that the
robustness test using a panel data fixed effects model.
models fit well.
Table 4 presents the logistic regression results (from
RESULTS
Table 3) using predicted probabilities to aid in interpreting
the results. The results in Table 4 indicate that, with all
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the
other variables held constant at their mean, the probability of
companies in the sample. Panel A provides the variable
a company just meeting or beating by just $0.01 their
descriptive statistics for all observations (10,088 firm
quarterly earnings estimates in quarter 2 was 0.32 in the prequarters in total). Panel B presents the variable descriptive
SOX period and 0.25 in the post-SOX period. In quarters 3
statistics for all observations divided into two subgroups: (1)
and 4, the probability of a company just meeting or beating
observations in which earnings per share does either meet or
their quarterly earnings estimates in the pre-SOX period was
just beat the forecast and (2) observations in which earnings
0.31 and .29, respectively, and 0.24 (for both quarters) in the
per share does not meet or just beat the forecast. Panel C
post-SOX period.
provides the percent of observations that: (1) exactly meet
My sample includes two observations for each
the forecast, (2) miss the forecast by more than $0.01, (3)
company, introducing serial correlation of the error terms.
miss the forecast by exactly $0.01, (4) beat the forecast by
To address this issue, I also run a panel data fixed effects
more than $0.01, (5) beat the forecast by exactly $0.01, and
model. These results (untabulated) are very similar to my
(6) exactly meet or beat the forecast by exactly $0.01. These
primary model results for the test variable.
percents are identified for all observations and separately for
the pre-SOX and post-SOX observations.
MBEit = α0 + β1SOXit + β2Lossit + β3Sizeit + β4Growthit + ε
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics

Variable
MBE
SOX
Loss
Size
Growth
Actual EPS
Forecast EPS
Forecast error

Variable
SOX
Loss
Size
Growth
Actual EPS
Forecast EPS
Forecast error
SOX
Loss
Size
Growth
Actual EPS
Forecast EPS
Forecast error

Panel A: Variable Descriptive Statistics – All Firms
Number of
Standard
Firms
Deviation
Mean
Median
Minimum
10,088
0.283
0
0.451
0
10,088
0.500
0.500
0.500
0
10,088
0.269
0
0.444
0
10,088
6.843
6.706
1.744
0.749
10,088
0.803
0.734
0.763
-2.459
10,088
0.520
0.250
17.031
-586
10,088
0.515
0.250
15.272
-500
10,088
0.005
0.010
2.759
-176
Panel B: Variable Descriptive Statistics Partitioned by MBE Variable
Number of
Standard
Firms
Deviation
Mean
Median
Minimum
MBE Firms
2,857
0.463
0
0.499
0
2,857
0.222
0
0.415
0
2,857
7.075
6.951
1.763
1.459
2,857
0.942
0.862
0.744
-1.533
2,857
0.286
0.270
0.325
-2.75
2,857
0.282
0.265
0.325
-2.75
2,857
0.004
0.000
0.005
0
Non-MBE Firms
7,231
0.514
1
0.500
0
7,231
0.288
0
0.453
0
7,231
6.751
6.609
1.728
0.749
7,231
0.784
0.688
0.764
-2.459
7,231
0.612
0.250
20.115
-586
7,231
0.607
0.240
18.037
-500
7,231
0.005
0.020
3.259
-176
Panel C: Composition of MBE Variable Partitioned by SOX Variable
Condition
All Firms
Pre-SOX
Post-Sox
16%
17%
15%
Meet
20%
20%
21%
Miss
5%
5%
5%
Just Miss
47%
45%
48%
Beat
12%
13%
11%
Just Beat
28%
30%
26%
MBE2

Maximum
1
1
1
13.091
6.518
1004
867
137

Maximum
1
1
13.091
5.529
2.02
2.02
0.01
1
1
12.819
6.518
1004
867
137

Variable Definitions (firm and quarter subscripts are not presented for simplicity):
= is a binary variable that equals 1 if the company either meets or just beats (by $0.01) their quarterly earnings forecast for
MBEit
company i in quarter t, 0 otherwise;
= is a binary variable that equals 1 if the quarterly financial statement is for a quarter in 2003, 0 otherwise;
SOXit
= is a binary variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss for company i in quarter t, 0 otherwise;
Lossit
= natural log of the market value of equity for company i at the end of the quarter (t-1);
Sizeit
= natural log of the market to book ratio for company i at the end of the quarter (t-1);
Growthit
= actual earnings per share for company i in quarter t;
Actual EPSit
Forecast EPSit = analysts’ forecasted earnings per share for company i in quarter t;
Forecast errorit = difference between Actual EPS and Forecast EPS for company i in quarter t;
= percent of firms that exactly meet their earnings per share forecast for company i in quarter t;
Meetit
= percent of firms that failed to meet their earnings per share forecast by more than $0.01 for company i in quarter t;
Missit
= percent of firms that failed to meet their earnings per share forecast by exactly $0.01 for company i in quarter t;
Just Missit
= percent of firms that meet their earnings per share forecast by more than $0.01 for company i in quarter t;
Beatit
= percent of firms that meet their earnings per share forecast by exactly $0.01 for company i in quarter t;
Just Beatit
= percent of firms that either exactly meet (Meet) or beat by exactly $0.01 (Just Beat) their earnings per share forecast for
MBE2it
company i in quarter t.
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TABLE 2
Correlation Matrix
Variable
MBE
SOX
Loss
Size
Growth

MBE
1.000
-0.046
-0.068
0.084
0.114

SOX

Loss

Size

Growth

1.000
-0.057
0.013
-0.018

1.00
-0.254
-0.103

1.000
0.319

1.000

All variables are defined at Table 1.

TABLE 3
Multiple Regression Results: Odds Ratio Output
MBEit = α0 + β1SOXit + β2Lossit + β3Sizeit + β4Growthit + ε

SOX
Loss
Size
Growth
Observations
Chi2
Prob>Chi2
Pseudo R2

Q1
1.033
0.795**
1.043
1.226***
2352
27.11
0.000
0.009

Q2
0.704***
0.774**
1.047*
1.292***
2486
50.10
0.000
0.018

Q3
0.702***
0.743***
1.067**
1.390***
2582
64.44
0.000
0.023

Q4
0.805**
0.745***
1.072***
1.481***
2668
72.02
0.000
0.025

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All Variables are defined at Table 1.

TABLE 4
Predicted Possibility of MBE = 1

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

Pre-SOX
0.2879
0.3204
0.3127
0.2858

SUMMARY AND LIMTATIONS
This study examines whether the provisions of SOX
Sections 302 and 906 are associated with improved quarterly
financial reporting quality. The results of my study indicate
that companies are less likely to just meet or beat by just
$0.01 their quarterly earnings forecasts following the
implementation of SOX Sections 302 and 906 for quarters 2,
3, and 4.
Because the provisions of SOX Sections 302 and 906
directly change primarily the expectations of management
related to quarterly filings, this study provides some

Post-SOX
0.2947
0.2491
0.2420
0.2437

evidence regarding the managers’ effect on financial
reporting quality separate from the auditor’s effect, to the
extent that financial reporting quality improved in the
interim quarters as well as the fourth quarter. These results
would seem to indicate that managers modified their
earnings management behavior in the post-SOX Sections
302 and 906 period resulting in improved quarterly financial
reporting quality.
A limitation of this study is the inability to isolate the
effect on quarterly financial reporting quality of actions
taken by management on their own initiative versus actions
taken by management or by the auditor at the request of the
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Board of Directors or the Audit Committee. It is possible
that either the Board or the Audit Committee required
management or the auditor to take certain actions or make
specific changes to their normal processes during the time
period of my analysis either as a result of SOX or the macroenvironment in general. Because I cannot observe the
actions of the Board or Audit Committee, the result is (best
case) noise in my model or (worst case) correlated omitted
variables. While I have tried to isolate the effects of
Sections 302 and 906 in my research design this study, at the
very least, should provide useful information about quarterly
financial reporting quality during this very interesting time.
Another limitation of this study is the use of a
company’s propensity to just meet or beat earnings estimates
as a proxy for financial reporting quality. A company’s
likelihood to just meet or beat their earnings forecasts could
be the result of earnings management or expectations
management. I propose that it is unlikely that the provisions
of SOX or the general investor climate during my test period
had a direct effect on a company’s intent to manage
expectations so I attribute the results of this study, and least
primarily, to the result of earnings management.
Subject to these limitations, this study makes several
contributions to the literature. First, it provides evidence
that the implementation of Sections 302 and 906 is
associated with improved quarterly financial reporting
quality. Second, it provides some evidence regarding
managements’ effect on quarterly financial reporting quality
separate from the auditor’s effect because this study
indicates that the interim quarters 2 and 3 are associated with
improved quarterly financial reporting quality as well as the
fourth quarter. Third, my results provide an indication of an
association between increased individual criminal liability
and changes in manager’s behavior. As a result of these
contributions, the results of this study should be interesting
to policy setters and regulators (SEC and PCAOB), auditors,
investors, academic researchers, and managers.
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